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Abstract
The ongoing review of the IMF, initiated in 2005 by Managing Director De Rato, presents an
excellent opportunity to re-examine the role, functions and governance of the Fund. In particular,
the objective, scope and conduct of IMF surveillance have been identiﬁed as a key area for
renewal. In this paper, we offer a new vision for IMF surveillance. There are two main parts to our
proposal. First, we develop “Guidelines for Economic Policy Frameworks” that outline the
objective and scope of surveillance. They delineate the benchmarks against which members
economic policy frameworks can be assessed. The Guidelines also serve to clarify the principles
under which surveillance is conducted, and reafﬁrm members’ commitments to the surveillance
process under their Article IV obligations. The second element of our proposal is a “Surveillance
Remit”. The Remit deﬁnes the aim of surveillance and the obligations of the Fund to pursue this
goal. As such the Remit creates a mechanism to hold the Fund accountable. An important
implication of the Remit is that it requires the Fund to become more independent in its day-to-day
operations. In addition, we propose procedures for communicating surveillance and for assessing
the Fund’s conduct of surveillance. Taken together, the various elements reinforce each other,
providing a clear role for the IMF, as well as its member countries, in the surveillance process.
This principles-based approach can bolster the credibility and legitimacy of surveillance, and
ultimately its effectiveness, to the beneﬁt of all members.
JEL classiﬁcation: F33
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics; Financial stability
Résumé
La réﬂexion sur le mandat du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) lancée par son directeur
général, Rodrigo de Rato, offre une excellente occasion de revoir le rôle, les fonctions et la
gouvernance de cette institution. En particulier, les objectifs, l’étendue et la conduite des activités
de surveillance du FMI ont été désignés comme des éléments prioritaires de la réforme. Dans cet
article, les auteurs proposent une nouvelle vision pour la fonction de surveillance exercée par le
Fonds. Leur proposition se divise en deux grands volets. Premièrement, les auteurs établissent des
lignes directrices relatives à la conduite des politiques économiques, qui explicitent les objectifs
et le champ des activités de surveillance ainsi que les critères sur lesquels se fondera l’évaluation
des cadres de conduite des politiques économiques des pays membres. Les lignes directrices ont
également pour objet de clariﬁer les principes qui guideront la fonction de surveillance et de
réafﬁrmer l’intérêt particulier des membres pour le processus de surveillance aux termes de leursiv
obligations au titre de l’Article IV. La seconde composante de la proposition est l’établissement
d’un mandat (remit) en matière de surveillance. Celui-ci précise l’objectif de la surveillance et les
obligations que doit respecter le Fonds dans la poursuite de cet objectif, ainsi que le mécanisme
par lequel l’institution devra répondre de la qualité de la surveillance exercée. Ce mandat a pour
importante implication d’obliger le Fonds à devenir plus indépendant dans la conduite de ses
activités courantes. Enﬁn, les auteurs proposent des procédures pour communiquer les résultats de
la surveillance et pour évaluer la façon dont le Fonds s’acquitte de cette responsabilité. Ces divers
éléments se renforcent mutuellement et déﬁnissent clairement le rôle que le FMI et ses pays
membres doivent jouer à l’égard de la fonction de surveillance. Cette approche fondée sur des
principes est susceptible de rehausser la crédibilité et la légitimité – et par le fait même l’efﬁcacité
– du Fonds en tant qu’organisme de surveillance, et ce, au bénéﬁce de tous les États membres.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F33
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales; Stabilité ﬁnancière  1 
1  Introduction 
The ongoing review of the IMF, initiated by Managing Director De Rato, presents an 
excellent opportunity to re-examine the role, functions and governance of the Fund. In 
particular, IMF surveillance has been identified as a key area for reform (King 2006a, 
Dodge 2006, Adams 2005). Improved surveillance is in the interest of all members, as it 
strengthens the Fund’s efforts to maintain external stability, promote orderly adjustment, 
and prevent crises. This is reflected by the growing recognition that the Fund should shift 
its efforts from crisis resolution towards crisis prevention, which is particularly important 
for emerging markets, as these are the most vulnerable to adverse economic events. But 
while most agree that the IMF is the institution charged with maintaining a well-
functioning international financial system, there has been less agreement about how IMF 
surveillance should be reformed to achieve this goal.  
The impetus for reform proposals has come from several sources, including the Bank of 
England (King 2006a) the U.S. Treasury (Adams 2005), and the IMFC (2006).  The latter 
for example, has emphasized the need for greater focus on multilateral issues, and 
consideration of a surveillance Remit.
2  At the same time, the IMF’s Strategic Review 
identified surveillance as a key area of reform (De Rato 2005), IMF staff have been 
exploring the merits of revising the 1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate 
Policies and the adoption of a Remit.  Moreover, these issues have been discussed at 
meetings of the IMF’s Executive Board.
3   These are clearly important steps forward, and 
to support these efforts, the Bank of Canada has been actively promoting the discussion 
on surveillance reform (Dodge 2006). 
In this paper, we offer a new vision for IMF surveillance that is very much in the spirit of 
the current proposals. There are two main parts to our proposal. First, we put forward 
“Guidelines for Economic Policy Frameworks” that outline the objective and scope of 
surveillance. The Guidelines can be viewed as the general principles on which a revised 
1977 Decision should be based. They delineate the benchmarks against which members’ 
economic policy frameworks can be assessed. Specifically, to make surveillance more 
focused, the IMF should assess the overall coherence of exchange rate, monetary, fiscal 
and financial policies, with a view to analyzing their effects on external stability. The 
Guidelines also serve to clarify the principles under which surveillance is conducted, and 
reaffirm members’ commitments to the surveillance process under their Article IV 
obligations.  
Having defined the scope of surveillance through the Guidelines, the second element of 
our proposal is to develop an institutional framework that supports the conduct of 
surveillance. Specifically, we aim to create an IMF that is more accountable, more 
transparent, and that has greater operational independence. The mechanism to achieve 
these objectives is a “Surveillance Remit”. The Remit defines the aim of surveillance and 
the obligations of the Fund to pursue this goal. An important implication of the Remit is 
that in order to assess the effects of Fund surveillance, it needs to disclose its surveillance 
                                                   
2 The purpose of the Remit is to provide guidance for the IMF’s surveillance efforts, and a mechanism for 
holding the Fund accountable (Lomax 2006) 
3 See IMF press release, November 30, 2006.     2 
activities through greater transparency. Hence, the Remit encourages greater candor in the 
surveillance process. 
Completing our proposal are procedures for communicating surveillance and for 
assessing the Fund’s conduct of surveillance. Taken together, this vision clarifies the 
roles and responsibilities of the IMF and its member countries in the surveillance process. 
We believe that this principles-based approach can bolster the credibility and legitimacy 
of surveillance, giving the Fund greater influence on the economic policies of members. 
Also, under our framework surveillance is more even-handed and objective, as members 
can hold the Fund accountable. A reform along the lines we propose would improve the 
overall conduct of surveillance, and the quality of the policy advice given by the Fund. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we illustrate how changes in the 
global economy require the Fund to give renewed emphasis to its surveillance function. 
In section 3, we outline our proposal for a new vision of IMF surveillance. Section 4 
offers conclusions. 
2  Surveillance in a Changing World 
2.1  A changing economic landscape  
The de jure basis for the current surveillance framework is the obligations of members 
under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement and the new Surveillance Decision, 
which builds on the 1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies.
4 While 
Article IV provides general goals and guidelines for surveillance, more specific measures 
were spelled out in the 1977 Decision.  
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the focus on exchange rate 
stability was understandable since few countries had truly flexible exchange rates. Since 
then, the world has evolved considerably (Lomax 2006). First, the global economy is 
increasingly interdependent and market-based, and flexible exchange rates have become 
more prominent. Second, as the world has become more integrated, countries have also 
become more vulnerable to cross-border shocks and policy spillover effects. Third, there 
is a growing number of emerging market economies that are systemically important and 
these countries, owing to their relatively less developed institutional environment, are 
more likely to be the cause of, or subject to, crises and contagion. Fourth, the breadth and 
scope of the crises experienced today are very large compared to the scope of Fund 
resources.
5 Lastly, many large emerging markets that could be potential Fund borrowers 
have reserves rivaling the Fund’s total lending resources.  
The consequence of these developments in the world economy is that surveillance is now 
viewed as the primary means by which the Fund pursue its goal of a well-functioning 
international financial system (King 2006a, Dodge 2006). In particular, Governors King 
and Dodge argue that the Fund should shift from focusing on crisis resolution to crisis 
                                                   
4 We refer to the “1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies” as the “1977 Decision”. 
5 Note that even if the IMF possessed sufficient resources, it is not clear that it should use them for large-
scale interventions. Large-scale interventions would exacerbate concerns about moral hazard, and the 
distortions that lending can cause with respect to debt renegotiations (Haldane and Kruger 2001).   3 
prevention. Within the Article IV consultation process, IMF surveillance has, to some 
extent, changed to reflect these evolving circumstances. But Fund surveillance has also 
been characterized by mission creep, as witnessed by its continued involvement in 
microeconomic and structural issues that are often unrelated to external stability. In the 
next section, we take a closer look at IMF surveillance and the challenges it faces.  
2.2 IMF surveillance: Practice and challenges 
The IMF defines its surveillance activities as “all aspects of the Fund’s analysis of, 
scrutiny over, and advice concerning, member countries’ economic situations, policies, 
and prospects” (Crow et al. 1999). One can distinguish between bilateral and multilateral 
surveillance:  
•  Bilateral surveillance refers to the surveillance of individual countries and is 
conducted through Article IV consultations, program reviews associated with the 
IMF’s financial assistance, and the Financial Sector Assessment Program.  
•  Multilateral surveillance refers to the surveillance of economic linkages between 
countries and international developments, including the global implications of 
policies pursued in individual member countries. Multilateral issues are discussed 
among members in multilateral consultations (International Monetary Fund 2007), 
and are taken up in various publications, such as the semiannual World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) and Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), as well as other staff 
reports (Mussa 1997). 
Multilateral and bilateral surveillance are closely linked; multilateral surveillance often 
draws on country-specific information obtained from bilateral surveillance. At the same 
time, the broader insights obtained from multilateral surveillance should ideally feed back 
into discussions with individual countries in the context of bilateral surveillance.  
2.3 Challenges in the IMF’s surveillance framework  
Over the past decades, IMF surveillance has often identified important deficiencies in 
member countries’ economic policies, and its policy advice has contributed to resolving 
these weaknesses. Consequently, the Fund has helped to improve the resilience of many 
members’ economies to domestic and external shocks. Still, past successes 
notwithstanding, there are a number of concerns in the current approach to surveillance:  
•  Surveillance remains overly focused on country-based, bilateral analysis. 
•  Bilateral surveillance suffers from mission creep. Article IV consultations often cover 
a broad range of issues, many of which are not relevant for countries’ external 
stability (Adams 2005).  
•  Inadequate emphasis is placed on the linkages between the real and financial sectors 
(IMF Independent Evaluation Office 2006).  
•  Multilateral issues addressed in the WEO and GFSR are not sufficiently integrated 
(IMF Independent Evaluation Office 2006), and a formal consultation procedure to 
deal with them is lacking.   4 
•  Emerging market countries are not always treated equally, and that the quality of 
advice can differ greatly between countries (Akyüz 2005, IMF Independent 
Evaluation Office 2007)  
•  The Fund is “failing to fully meet its core responsibility” of surveillance over 
exchange rate policies (IMF Independent Evaluation Office 2007). 
Concerns have also been raised that the institutional framework of the Fund does not 
adequately support candid and effective surveillance: 
•  Political interference in the Fund’s daily operations compromises the objectivity of its 
surveillance (Cottarelli 2005)
6  
•  Countries often vet Article IV surveillance reports, and since the staff knows that 
members may resist a truly candid assessment, surveillance reports may be self-
censored. Also, staff lacks the proper incentives from senior management and the 
Executive Board to produce high quality surveillance (IMF Independent Evaluation 
Office 2007). 
•  Article IV reviews are still not always published (International Monetary Fund 
2005).
7   
•  Staff tend to want to present a unified view; internal disagreements are generally not 
revealed to the Board (Crow et al. 1999).
8  
•  The respective roles of the Fund and its members in the surveillance process are 
unclear (IMF Independent Evaluation Office 2007) and thus there is a concern that 
members may lose sight of their commitments to Article IV (Balls 2003)  
It is with these challenges in mind that we propose a new vision for the reform of IMF 
surveillance. Our proposals are inspired e.g. by the Bank of England (King 2006a, King 
2006b), the U.S. Treasury (Adams 2005), the IMFC (2006) and parallel efforts by the 
IMF. Specifically, as part of the review of the IMF’s Medium-Term Strategy, the Fund 
has adopted a new Surveillance Decision in June 2007, and is exploring the possibility of 
a Remit (see box 1). These are clearly important steps forward. However, given that the 
reform process proceeds along various workstreams, it is not always clear how the 
different reform proposals fit together.  By providing a coherent, integrated vision for 
IMF surveillance, we intend to set out the goalposts for the ongoing policy debate. 
                                                   
6 An example of political interference in the Fund’s daily operations is that the Executive Board discusses 
every country’s Article IV consultation. In our view, the Board should concentrate on the Fund’s strategic 
framework, rather then “micro-manage” the work done by Fund staff. 
7 Over 20 percent of reviews for emerging markets were withheld from publication in 2005, with much 
higher rates for countries in Asia, the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere, where most systemically 
important emerging markets are found (International Monetary Fund 2006a). Publication lags for emerging 
markets are considerable, with the average report being published nine months after completion of the 
initial staff document. And of those made public, nearly a fifth are published with significant deletions. 
8 The Fund rarely uses existing procedures to discuss policies inconsistent with Article IV obligations.  For 
instance, the 1977 Decision contains the possibility to engage in special consultations, but in practice such 
consultations are never undertaken (International Monetary Fund 2006b).   5 
3  A New Vision for IMF Surveillance 
In order for the Fund to fulfill its role of maintaining a well-functioning international 
monetary system, surveillance must have clearly defined objectives and must be properly 
focused. Moreover, surveillance needs to be supported by a suitable institutional 
framework, including the commitment of its members to the surveillance process, and 
sufficient credibility and legitimacy to implement it. Ideally, the institution (i) is 
transparent, (ii) has sufficient operational independence, and (iii) is held accountable for 
its actions (Maier and Santor 2007). In what follows, we offer reforms that seek to 
address these challenges.  
 
Box 1: The ongoing IMF Strategic Review 
The IMF’s Managing Director De Rato discussed a review of the Fund’s Medium Term 
Strategy at the IMF Annual Meeting in 2005 (De Rato 2005). On surveillance, the review 
acknowledges that the IMF has to improve its analysis of risks to international economic 
stability, including trade and payments imbalances, currency misalignments, and 
financial market disturbances. Consequently, the IMF staff has explored the merits of 
revising the 1977 Decision and the adoption of a Remit. These issues have been discussed 
at meetings of the IMF’s Executive Board, and on June 15, 2007, the Board approved the 
New Surveillance Decision. 
More specifically, the Executive Board has (i) exchanged views on the launch of 
multilateral consultations for addressing global imbalances, (ii) explored reviewing the 
1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies; (iii) participated in a 
seminar taking stock of the treatment of Exchange Rate Issues in Bilateral Surveillance, 
and (iv) discussed setting a new Surveillance Remit (see the IMF press release on 
November 30, 2006). 
3.1  An operational proposal 
Our framework consists of three mutually reinforcing parts: the Guidelines for Economic 
Policy Frameworks, the Remit, and a Framework for Assessing Surveillance, part of 
which is related to how the Fund should communicate surveillance. 
1.  The Guidelines for Economic Policy Frameworks establish the objectives and scope 
of IMF surveillance, and the criteria by which member’s economic policy 
frameworks will be evaluated. They also outline members’ obligations to the 
surveillance process. The Guidelines can be viewed as the general principles on 
which surveillance should be based. 
2.  The Remit sets out the IMF’s obligations in the conduct of surveillance. It establishes 
the priorities for surveillance and a procedure to hold the Fund accountable.  
3.  As per the Remit, the IMF will be held directly accountable for conducting 
surveillance. As an important part of surveillance is communication, we include 
procedures to ensure a candid and transparent process in our Framework for 
Communicating and Assessing Surveillance. These set out the criteria on which 
assessment of IMF surveillance will be conducted.   6 
This framework does not create new obligations for members. The framework will 
achieve two main goals. First, we create a process for surveillance by consolidating 
existing commitments of members in a single document (the Guidelines for Economic 
Policy Framework). Second, we limit the focus of IMF surveillance by requiring that 
policy advice is restricted to areas relevant for external stability. This reduces the areas 
covered by IMF surveillance, and limits the conditions members have to meet during the 
surveillance procedure. In particular, surveillance over domestic policies will not become 
an obligation for members, as domestic policies will only be considered as they relate to 
external stability. In what follows, we discuss the three parts of the framework in turn.  
3.2  Guidelines for members’ economic policy frameworks 
The Guidelines are the key to our vision, as they set out the core principles by which 
surveillance should be conducted. There are four main elements to the Guidelines for 
Economic Policy Frameworks: obligations of members, objectives, scope, and how 
surveillance should be conducted.  
A. Obligations of Members 
The Guidelines are a restatement of each member’s general commitments under Section 
1, Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Article IV contains both the objectives 
of Fund surveillance and the obligations for members. Specifically, the Articles and the 
consultations that the IMF conducts encourage members to “direct their economic and 
financial policies towards … fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price 
stability” and to “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system 
… to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment”. These obligations remain as 
valid today as they were in 1944.  However, the objectives, principles, and obligations of 
members (and the guidelines by which they objectives will be achieved) have been 
adapted to reflect the current and likely future global economic environment.  
B. Core objective for economic policy frameworks 
The core objective of surveillance under the Guidelines is for members to maintain 
economic policy frameworks that support external stability and promote orderly 
adjustment, and thus contribute to a stable and efficient market-based international 
financial system. A market-based international financial system is one in which the 
allocation of resources is primarily determined by market mechanisms.  
This core objective has both a positive and a normative element. First, it reflects that in 
today’s world, financial markets are de facto the principal means of allocating resources 
within and across economies (regardless of the degree to which market forces act in local 
economies). Second, from a normative perspective, it recognizes that the creation of more 
complete financial markets, i.e. deep and liquid markets free of non-market distortions, is 
the best means of facilitating allocative efficiency and diversification of risk across 
markets and time. By promoting the creation of complete markets and international 
financial stability, the IMF helps to facilitate the exchange of goods, services and capital 
among countries, which ultimately increases economic welfare.    7 
C. Guidelines for economic policies: the scope of surveillance 
Having defined this core objective, IMF surveillance should aim to address policies that 
affect external stability, prevent orderly adjustment, undermine the creation of complete 
markets, or that create negative spillovers between countries. This restricts the focus of 
surveillance to policies relevant for achieving these objectives. We can identify four key 
policy areas: exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial policies. Governments’ 
economic policy frameworks in these four areas should be jointly consistent, and directed 
towards contributing to external stability, by removing existing distortions to market 
adjustment mechanisms, and by promoting policies that serve to complete markets.
9  
The focus on the four core macro policy areas implies that less attention will be devoted 
to domestic policies or structural issues, such as a country’s health care system, 
liberalization of the energy sector, pension reform or flexibility of labour markets. While 
sound policy in these areas may be important to create economic growth, they should not 
be the focus of IMF surveillance, if they are not directly relevant to the maintenance of 
external stability.
10 To make this operational, a set of Guidelines for Economic Policy 
Frameworks are contained in Annex A. 
While the objectives set out in the Guidelines are, in many ways, best practice standards, 
IMF surveillance must take into account country-specific circumstances in its analysis 
and policy commentary. The membership of the IMF is heterogeneous in terms of the 
level of development, market completeness, and the technical capacity to implement 
specific policy frameworks. Consequently, it is unlikely that many low and middle-
income countries will be able to abide immediately by the policy frameworks set out in 
the Guidelines. The IMF will thus need to be sensitive to local conditions in the conduct 
of surveillance. Nevertheless, as low-to-middle income members develop, they should 
strive towards achieving best practice for exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial 
policy frameworks. IMF surveillance should facilitate this process by enhancing the 
movement of these economies along the development path and their transition into the 
international monetary system. 
D. The Conduct of Surveillance 
Having defined benchmarks to evaluate members’ economic policy frameworks, the 
conduct of bilateral surveillance should proceed as follows. Countries are free to choose 
their preferred economic policy frameworks. For instance, they can choose a fixed or 
flexible exchange rate, depending on their circumstances, including their level of 
economic development. Countries are encouraged to self-identify their policies and report 
them to the IMF. Such self-identification of policies would represent best practice, but 
the Fund can assist countries in the identification process, if desired. Member self-
identification bolsters the legitimacy of surveillance, since it creates a benchmark against 
                                                   
9 This approach differs from a model-based assessment of exchange rates. By examining the mechanisms 
underlying real adjustment, it no longer requires calculation of “equilibrium exchange rates”. 
10 For example, the 2006 Article IV consultation for Canada explored issues such as female labour 
participation, unemployment insurance programs, and immigration policies. None of these issues are linked 
to Canada’s external stability. This is not to encourage countries to adopt inefficient domestic policies. 
However, other institutions like the OECD or the World Bank are better suited for advice on policies to 
generate economic growth.   8 
which members can be held accountable. The use of these policy frameworks as 
benchmarks makes the process more transparent, and ensures that the specified 
frameworks recognize the different economic circumstances and policy preferences of 
each country. 
Based on the self-identified policy frameworks, the IMF assesses whether the policy 
frameworks are consistent, and whether they are, in fact, being implemented. Under the 
Guidelines, a surveillance issue would arise if, for example, a country attempts to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital flows and an autonomous monetary policy at 
the same time. Further surveillance efforts are only required if i) actual policies are not 
consistent with the self-identified framework and may lead to external instability,
 11 ii) a 
particular combination of policies leads to negative spillovers or is not compatible with 
promoting an efficient and stable market-based international financial system, or iii) the 
member fails to adhere to its obligations in the surveillance process. 
In conducting multilateral surveillance, the IMF provides members with information on 
external risks or spill-over effects of policies, and provides recommendations for policy 
action. Where coordinated policy actions are required, it performs time-limited 
multilateral or bilateral (special) consultations to discuss the policies of a country or 
group of countries posing a risk to the financial system. Moreover, the risks identified by 
multilateral surveillance can feed back into the bilateral surveillance process, making 
countries aware of potential problems, or how they may be contributing to them.  
As an institution, the IMF has a comparative advantage in the conduct of multilateral 
surveillance relative to markets, since it has considerable expertise in analyzing and 
modeling the world economy and has a longer policy horizon.
12 If surveillance is 
conducted based on these guidelines, the Fund identifies and makes recommendations to 
mitigate market-distorting policies. This approach promotes the development of more 
complete markets, while acknowledging and accounting for the reality that members may 
be at different points on the transition path of economic development. Having set out the 
objectives and scope of surveillance, we now turn to discussing the obligations of the 
Fund for the conduct of surveillance. 
3.3  The Remit 
The Remit is a directive from the IMF’s members to the Managing Director and the Staff 
that specifies the general principles under which surveillance is conducted. The Remit 
serves several fundamental purposes: 
•  stating the obligations of the IMF for the conduct of surveillance; 
•  clearly defining the objective of surveillance and delineating its scope through 
reference to the Guidelines; 
                                                   
11 A case for further investigation could exist if, for instance, countries pursue a set of exchange rate 
policies that inhibit real exchange rate adjustment.  
12 For instance, apart from the models employed at the FED Board of Governors, the IMF’s Global 
Economic Model is perhaps the most advanced model of its kind in the world. Clearly, economic models 
have limitations and should not be the only source of policy assessment. Still, the fact that similar types of 
models simply do not exist in the private sector is an indication of the IMF’s comparative advantage in 
analyzing multilateral issues.   9 
•  reaffirming members’ commitments under their Article IV obligations, on a regular 
basis (e.g. every 1-3 years); 
•  setting the priorities for multilateral surveillance, and updating them regularly; 
•  promoting independence in the IMF’s daily operations, while holding the Fund 
accountable for the conduct of surveillance; 
As the institutional basis of a renewed commitment between members and the Fund, the 
Remit emphasizes the importance of existing obligations by setting them within a formal 
framework. It creates a symmetric relationship between the obligation of the Fund to 
conduct surveillance, and the responsibility of members to facilitate the surveillance 
process. In essence, members charge the Fund to conduct surveillance and, in return, 
agree to recognize its role and respond to the policy advice it has generated. This renewed 
commitment underscores the notion that Fund surveillance is effective only if all 
members actively participate in the process. 
The Remit bolsters the effectiveness of IMF surveillance through several channels. First, 
by giving the Fund a clear mandate for surveillance, the Remit increases the IMF’s 
accountability. Put simply, the obligation of the Fund to fulfill its mandate and the duty 
of members to hold it to account aligns the incentives of all parties. Second, by clearly 
identifying the obligations of all parties and the process by which Fund surveillance will 
be conducted and evaluated, the Remit augments (and in fact requires) transparency. 
Third, the Remit underscores the importance of operational independence: greater 
accountability and transparency are only meaningful if the Fund has the freedom to carry 
out its surveillance activities unimpeded by political considerations. Operational 
independence also helps to ensure the objectivity of the Fund’s analysis, and increases the 
traction of surveillance on the economic policies of members. Also, as the scope of 
surveillance is reduced to policies relevant for external stability, all members will be 
treated equally. Hence, IMF surveillance would become more even-handed.  
Finally, the Remit incorporates the delineation of the scope of IMF surveillance as 
presented in the Guidelines. The Remit highlights the importance of multilateral 
surveillance and its interaction with bilateral surveillance. How the IMF communicates 
surveillance, and thus also held accountable, is discussed in the following sections. 
3.4  A Framework for Communicating and Assessing Surveillance 
As per the Remit, the MD and, indirectly, IMF senior management and the staff, are 
accountable to the Executive Board for the conduct of surveillance. In order to hold them 
accountable, one needs easily verifiable, objective criteria to assess their actions and their 
effects. However, it is difficult to measure the effects of surveillance– e.g. “a well-
functioning international financial system” is not an operational criterion – and thus the 
assessment of surveillance cannot focus exclusively on economic outcomes (Duignan and 
Bjorksten 2005). Therefore, we propose a Framework for Communicating and Assessing 
Surveillance that emphasizes qualitative measures as the basis of assessment. 
Let us start by looking at communication. To evaluate surveillance, transparency about 
the Fund’s actions and recommendations is needed. Clear communication is also an 
important element for making surveillance more effective. We propose two significant 
changes: greater transparency in communicating surveillance, and a process for cases in   10 
which members are not meeting their obligations to the surveillance process. Each will be 
considered in turn. 
Communicating surveillance 
To increase the effectiveness of surveillance, the incentives for national authorities to pay 
attention to the policy recommendations needs to be increased. Past experience has 
shown that the peer pressure exerted through meetings of the IMF’s Executive Board 
may not be sufficient (Fischer 1999). We propose that the IMF is obligated to 
communicate its surveillance activities in a complete, timely and transparent manner. As 
a result, publication of Article IV reports – the main channel of bilateral surveillance – 
should be considered best practice. Similarly, multilateral surveillance efforts should be 
openly conveyed through the WEO and GFSR.  
Regular communication and transparency will permit early identification of problems, 
and help to avoid situations in which the IMF is reluctant to be transparent for fear of 
triggering a crisis. This enhances the effectiveness of surveillance through public 
disclosure. Clear communication will also help to avoid mission creep, since IMF 
surveillance activities are easily monitored.  
While a majority of countries are likely to comply with their obligations, there might be 
instances where policy frameworks are inconsistent and entail negative spillovers, and 
thus have negative implications for the international financial system. Similarly, cases 
could arise where members persistently fail to honour their obligations. In such an 
instance, the IMF may want to implement a policy in which the Fund will gradually 
increase the level of transparency of its surveillance findings to provide countries with 
incentives to address IMF concerns.
13 This mirrors schedules used by financial regulators 
when dealing with problematic banks.
14 For instance, one could think of a clearly 
outlined sequence of actions, beginning with a confidential expression of concern to the 
authorities, gradually progressing to special consultations, and ultimately leading to full 
public disclosure of the Fund’s analysis. An example of such a schedule with “escalating 
transparency” is discussed in Annex C.1. By specifying a pre-announced sequence of 
information releases, the IMF gives local authorities time to react and to implement 
policy reforms. Moreover, it provides guidance to financial markets in judging the Fund’s 
concerns.
15  
                                                   
13 According to the 1977 Decision, the IMF can consult with the countries if they fail to comply with its 
advice. If such consultations do not resolve the issue, the IMF might bring the issue to the Executive Board. 
Throughout this process, however, confidentiality is the overriding principle. Note that the 1977 Decision 
contains provisions to deal with non-complying members (such as a procedure to call “Special 
consultations”), but in practice they are not invoked. 
14 See the “Guide to Intervention for Federal Financial Institutions” of the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (downloadable at www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca).  
15 A necessary condition for increased transparency to affect financial markets is that the Fund actually 
produce useful information. If IMF surveillance does not “add value”, countries and financial markets will 
ignore its findings. At the same time, if the Staff is wrong in its assessment, incorrect signals to markets 
could cause unwarranted economic disruption and weaken the Fund’s credibility. To mitigate these issues, 
it is important that the Fund be held accountable for conducting and communicating surveillance.   11 
Assessing surveillance 
To ensure that our communication procedures will be followed by the Fund, they are part 
of the Framework for Assessing Surveillance. In order to hold the MD and the staff 
accountable, they will be assessed on whether they have, ex ante, identified the correct 
priorities and taken the right steps in the conduct of surveillance, including effective 
communication and the appropriate degree of transparency. Additionally, one could 
examine whether the correct set of procedures has been followed when conducting 
bilateral and multilateral surveillance.  
To this end, our Framework for Assessing Surveillance (see annex C.2) includes criteria 
focusing on the quality of the Fund’s economic analysis, the advice given, and the 
communication procedure. A transparent assessment process will also help to address the 
potential problem of political considerations influencing the conduct of surveillance. 
Lastly, the IEO could perform periodic assessments based on these criteria. 
3.5  The benefits of surveillance reform 
Taken together, the three elements of our vision for IMF surveillance reform create an 
integrated process, which should ultimately lead to improved surveillance and better 
policy advice. These reforms are beneficial for all members, but particularly so for 
emerging market economies. Emerging economies are generally more vulnerable to 
adverse global developments, and the reaction of financial markets to negative news can 
be difficult to predict. Improving their resilience to negative shocks is therefore an 
important goal for IMF surveillance.  More specifically, emerging markets are vulnerable 
to two important types of negative spillovers:  
•  first, adverse global economic events (such as a disorderly unwinding of global 
imbalances);  
•  second, negative spillovers, for instance when other emerging markets find 
themselves in a difficult situation.  
Our vision for IMF reform yields improvements on both aspects: first, by setting up a 
clear process, all countries will be treated equally. This means that all countries receive 
the same candid and transparent assessment. Clarity about potentially adverse economic 
developments triggered by systemically important economies may help reduce the 
likelihood of negative global events. And second, surveillance reform along our 
proposals will help financial markets to better distinguish between emerging markets. A 
thorough and unbiased surveillance process, identifying those members implementing 
good policies, helps financial markets in their assessment, if negative shocks were to 
occur. Consequently, countries are less likely to experience sudden reversals of capital 
flows when potentially damaging spillovers are mitigated by good policies. And lastly, 
our principles-based Guidelines have emphasized the need for flexibility as the core 
objective for economic policy frameworks. As indicated before, countries can decide to 
peg their exchange rate, if they wish. However, by taking into account a broad set of 
indicators to see whether countries allow real adjustment, the Guidelines go beyond a 
pure model-based assessment of exchange rates.    12 
4  Conclusion 
Policymakers and the IMF are currently engaged in efforts to reform IMF surveillance. 
We have argued that the objectives, scope and conduct of IMF surveillance are neither 
sufficiently well-defined, nor sufficiently focused on external stability and multilateral 
issues. Furthermore, a lack of transparency, accountability and operational independence 
does not provide the proper incentives for the conduct of surveillance. In order for the 
Fund to play a key role in crisis prevention, reforms of IMF surveillance must address 
these issues. 
To this end, we propose a set of Guidelines for Economic Policy Frameworks for 
members that serve a dual purpose: first, as a set of best practice guidelines for members’ 
economic policy frameworks, and second, as a benchmark for the conduct of 
surveillance. We also propose a series of reforms to ensure that the IMF becomes more 
transparent, and is held accountable for its actions. Our reforms are principles-based, that 
is, they go beyond the question whether one (relatively arbitrary) variable is beyond a 
certain threshold. Instead, by focusing on fostering a market-based international financial 
system as the core objective of IMF surveillance, our list of indicators in the Guidelines is 
closely linked to addressing policies undermining external stability, preventing orderly 
adjustment, or creating negative spillovers between countries. 
These reforms, we would argue, are in the interest of all members, since they can expect 
to receive focused, high quality bilateral and multilateral surveillance in a transparent and 
candid manner. Special benefits arise for emerging market economies, since effective 
multilateral surveillance will help to protect them from being side-swiped by adverse 
global economic events. They should also benefit from the fact that our reform proposals 
will ensure that surveillance is conducted in an even-handed and consistent manner for all 
members, implying that external stability of developed and developing will be assessed 
on the basis of the same criteria. 
That said, a number of caveats should be mentioned. The effectiveness of surveillance 
hinges critically upon members’ level of commitment. IMF surveillance will only be able 
to influence national economic policies if all countries recognise the value of a stable and 
efficient international financial system, and the IMF’s role in achieving this goal. Such 
cooperation is vital for the success of any international institution. IMF surveillance must 
also be forward looking and flexible, to accommodate and encourage the ongoing 
development of an increasingly market-based international financial system. In particular, 
IMF surveillance should continue to adapt to a world in which emerging markets are 
playing an ever-increasing role, and be ready to re-examine its role in light of these 
trends. This will help to ensure that its efforts are successfully directed towards 
minimizing risks and vulnerabilities, and generating sustainable global economic growth.  
The ultimate test of whether surveillance is effective is whether it leads to better policies 
and preserves the stability of the international financial system. This requires the IMF to 
be in a position to provide candid, open, and even-handed surveillance. To bring about 
this change, implementing these proposals would be a great step forward.  13 
Annex A: Guidelines for Economic Policy Frameworks 
1. Core objective and principles 
1.1 Objective 
In light of their Article IV obligations, members agree to maintain economic policy 
frameworks that support a stable and efficient market-based international financial 
system, thus promoting the IMF’s objective of contributing to global economic prosperity 
by facilitating the exchange of goods, services and capital among countries. 
1.2 Principles 
To achieve this objective, members agree to establish frameworks for their exchange rate, 
monetary, fiscal and financial sector policies. In formulating their policies, members shall 
take into consideration the Guidelines for Member’s Policy Frameworks. Upon request, 
the Fund shall assist members in the identification of their frameworks. Members will 
establish policies that:  
•  are jointly consistent;  
•  are consistent with obtaining external stability, promoting orderly external 
adjustment, and reasonable price stability;  
•  take into account the interdependence of member countries in order to limit and 
mitigate any negative spillovers from their policy framework on other members. 
Given these principles, in carrying out bilateral surveillance, the IMF shall: 
•  evaluate whether member’s exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial policy 
frameworks are adequately specified, jointly coherent and are consistent with 
external stability; 
•  assess whether members are following their identified policies; 
•  evaluate the international spillover effects of any deviations from their exchange 
rate arrangements and policy frameworks;  
•  assess the implications for the member of the external risks and spillovers 
identified through multilateral surveillance and propose policy recommendations  
In carrying out multilateral surveillance, the IMF shall: 
•  provide members with information on external risks or any spill-over effects of 
policies in systemic countries and provide recommendations for policy actions;  
•  allow the Fund to call time-limited multilateral or bilateral (special) consultations 
to discuss the policies of a country or group of countries posing a risk to the 
international financial system. 
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2. Members’ obligations 
In support of the above stated objective and principles, members agree to 
•  identify their respective policy frameworks to the IMF and update them annually; 
•  implement policies that are consistent with these frameworks; 
•  allow the IMF to independently assess whether members are following their stated 
policy frameworks and evaluate the international spillover effects of any deviations 
from their stated policy frameworks; 
•  permit the publication of IMF Article IV reports that will include these assessments 
and evaluations; 
•  allow the IMF to conduct special bilateral or multilateral consultations with respect to 
the assessment and evaluation of the member’s policy framework; 
•  cooperate fully with any special bilateral or multilateral consultations and permit the 
publication of the proceedings. 
3. Policy Frameworks  
This section describes the guidelines for the respective exchange rate, monetary, fiscal 
and financial policy frameworks that each member country reports to the IMF. Each of 
the four economic policy frameworks should be jointly consistent with each other. 
3.1 Exchange Rate Framework 
i)  members can choose an exchange rate regime that they feel is suitable to their 
own economic circumstances; 
ii)  the exchange rate regime should consist of a unified exchange rate that is 
convertible for current account transactions; 
iii) regardless of the exchange rate regime chosen, economic policies must 
facilitate effective balance of payments adjustment by allowing real exchange 
rate adjustment over the medium-term;  
iv) in accordance with (iii), countries should not engage in prolonged large scale 
sterilized intervention in one direction.  
3.2 Monetary Policy Framework 
i)  members shall ensure that their exchange rate and monetary policies are 
jointly consistent; 
ii)  monetary policy should aim to achieve reasonable price or nominal exchange 
rate stability (depending on the choice of exchange rate regime) over the 
medium term; 
iii) the central bank should be given sufficient independence to achieve these 
alternative goals, for which it will be held accountable; 
iv) the goals and implementation of monetary policy should be communicated 
transparently, in accordance with the standards and codes developed on 
Monetary Policy Transparency. 
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3.3 Fiscal Policy Framework 
i)  fiscal policy should strive to manage public resources in an efficient and 
sustainable manner;  
ii)  public debt sustainability over the medium-term should be a key principle of 
fiscal policy; 
iii) public deficit financing should be debt-based and consistent with the 
member’s monetary and exchange-rate policy; 
iv) members should work towards the development of a transparent fiscal policy, 
in accordance with the standards and codes on Fiscal Transparency. 
3.4 Financial Policy Framework 
i)  financial sector policies should aim to promote a stable and efficient financial 
system; 
ii)  administrative measures (e.g. capital controls) that attempt to reconcile 
inconsistent monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies by limiting the impact 
of market forces, should be eliminated over the medium term; 
iii) members should aim to work towards meeting the standards and codes on 
Financial Policy Transparency; 
iv) members should aim to participate in and allow the publication of Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) and Reports on Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs); 
v)  financial system regulation and supervision should be given sufficient 
independence to pursue a preventative approach to maintaining domestic 
financial stability.   16 
Annex B: Annual remit for IMF surveillance 
Under Article IV it is recognized that a stable and efficient international financial system 
is a joint responsibility of the IMF and its member countries. The role of the Fund is to 
oversee the effective operation of this system. In turn, members have the obligation to 
implement external and domestic economic policies that are consistent with this 
objective. The IMF is tasked with monitoring member’s adherence to such policies, just 
as it is the obligation of members to collaborate with the Fund and each other to ensure 
effective surveillance.  
To re-affirm this mutual commitment, members agree to provide the IMF with a 
mandate, or remit, to carry out bilateral and multilateral surveillance. The following 
principles define this mandate: 
i)  The purpose of IMF surveillance is to promote a stable and efficient international 
financial system; 
ii)  Surveillance shall be implemented according to the Guidelines for Surveillance;  
iii) Surveillance over all members shall be conducted in an objective and even-handed 
manner; 
iv) Members shall cooperate fully and actively with the Fund as it conducts its 
surveillance activity. 
In addition, for bilateral surveillance, it is established that:  
i)  Members shall re-affirm their Article IV commitments to implementing economic 
policies that are consistent with external stability; 
ii) Members shall grant the Fund a mandate to carry out surveillance over their economic 
policies to ensure their adherence to their Article IV commitments. 
Moreover, for multilateral surveillance, the IMF 
i)  Shall address the priorities for multilateral surveillance as set out in the annex to this 
remit; 
ii)  Call multilateral consultations if required. 
The Managing Director shall report to the Executive Board and be held accountable for 
the conduct of surveillance against this remit. The Executive Board has the obligation to 
assess the effectiveness of the Fund’s surveillance. The Fund must provide the Executive 
Board with all the information necessary for the assessment of its performance in a 
complete and timely manner. The evaluation of surveillance shall be based on the criteria 
set out in the Framework for Assessing Surveillance. The Executive Board must indicate 
areas in which the Managing Director has not fulfilled his surveillance mandate and 
recommend action. The assessment of surveillance should be reported annually to the 
IMFC and periodically to the Board of Governors. The conduct of surveillance will also 
be the subject of an independent assessment.    17 
Annex to the Remit: Examples for Priorities for Multilateral Surveillance 
The following priorities have been identified by members as key objectives for 
multilateral surveillance:  
1  The orderly resolution of global payments imbalances; 
2  External stability in the context of a potential rise in world interest rates; and 
3  External stability in a context of high oil prices and possible oil market shocks. 
Members shall assess the Fund’s implementation of these surveillance priorities at the 
end of the assessment period.  In doing so, they will evaluate whether these issues were 
addressed in an efficient and timely manner, the content of the Fund’s analysis, and the 
Fund’s communication of its analysis and recommendations. 
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Annex C: A Framework for Communicating and Assessing Surveillance 
C.1: Communicating surveillance 
The following principles will guide the IMF’s communication of surveillance: 
Commitment to transparency. The IMF has an obligation to communicate its 
surveillance in a complete, timely and transparent manner.  
Full publication. The publication of Article IV reports, the main channel of bilateral 
surveillance, is mandatory, as is the publication of any multilateral surveillance critical to 
implementing the surveillance remit. 
Prudence. The timing of public disclosures should take into account the potential for 
negative market reaction. However, full disclosure of surveillance must occur within a 
relatively short period. 
Escalating transparency. The communication procedure for dealing with members 
in breach of their obligations follows a fixed and public schedule: 
1.  Confidential expression of concern: the Fund confidentially indicates to the 
member that it perceives a violation of obligations and discusses remedial steps.  
2.  Confidential Board discussion: If authorities do not address the Fund’s concerns, 
the issue will be brought to Executive Directors for a confidential discussion. 
3.  Special consultations: The Fund publicly announces that it is sending a special 
mission to gather more information and to formally consult with authorities. At this 
stage, it is not necessary to expose details of the mission. 
4.  Public communiqué on special consultations: The Fund comments on the results of 
the consultations. If an agreement cannot be reached, the Fund will make its concerns 
public. In either case, the Fund provides markets with a synopsis of the issue at hand. 
5.  Publication of IMF analysis: A detailed analysis is released to the public, explaining 
the Fund’s concerns and the authorities’ reluctance to address them. If authorities are 
clearly collaborating with the Fund at this stage, publication could be withheld until a 
full evaluation of the country’s proposed corrective action is completed. 
6.  Publication in the WEO or the GFSR: A synopsis of the analysis in step 5 could be 
made available to a much wider audience, time permitting. 
7.  Discussion at the IMFC: This measure represents an expression of deep concern to 
global authorities. It should be based on the published analysis in step 5. 
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C.2: Assessing Surveillance 
Criteria by which the IMF will be assessed under the surveillance remit include: 
 
1  General: Did the IMF  
i)  conduct surveillance in an even-handed and unbiased manner? 
ii)  conduct surveillance using state-of the art economic techniques and 
appropriate methodologies? 
iii)  clearly publish inputs used for its assessment and reveal assumptions 
underlying its analysis? 
iv)  communicate its surveillance findings following the Communication 
procedure (see annex C)? 
v)  conduct surveillance on the special issues indicated in the remit? 
vi)  devote the needed resources to surveillance? 
 
2  Bilateral Surveillance: Did the IMF  
i)  conduct surveillance over the internal consistency of members’ stated and 
actual economic policy frameworks (exchange rate, monetary, fiscal, 
financial)? 
ii)  identify policy framework inconsistencies? 
iii)  identify spillovers? 
iv)  provide appropriate advice to members? 
v)  in the case of non-compliance, invoke the process of escalating transparency? 
vi)  identify countries at risk of a crisis and their possible spillovers? 
 
3  Multilateral Surveillance: Did the IMF do the following 
i)  identify appropriate and relevant multilateral surveillance issues? 
ii)  provide suitable policy advice? 
iii)  call multilateral consultations as needed? 
iv)  consult the appropriate set of countries? 
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